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I. The scholar  
Undoubtedly one of the best economists of his generation and on the Nobel track, Emmanuel Farhi was born on 
September 8, 1978 in Paris. Ranked first at the age of 16 in the French high school competition in physics, he 
could have become a physicist. The assistant of Cédric Villani, 2010 Fields medalist, he could have become a top 
mathematician himself. I could equally have envisioned him a startupper or a top civil servant; indeed, he long 
hesitated to continue his career within the corps des Mines, the elite French civil-service corps. But reading Paul 
Samuelson’s text convinced him that economic ideas are an alternative route to making this world a better place, 
and so he opted to study for an economics PhD at MIT after his studies at Lycée Louis-le-Grand and École 
Normale Supérieure. He wrote his thesis under the supervision of Ivan Werning and Ricardo Caballero. He was 
a faculty in the Harvard economics department from 2006 through 2020, receiving tenured five years only after 
his PhD. 
His scientific approach is characterized by five traits. First, Emmanuel was unabashed about being a theorist. 
While he welcomed the data revolution, he believed in the power of ideas. And the realm of ideas was his kingdom. 
He felt that, while facts are important, they need a framework to become compelling. Theory further supplies 
the normative structure, which enables the move to policy recommendations, which were central to his career 
choice. In this respect, as in many others, Emmanuel was the worthy heir of the founders of the Econometric 
Society: When in 1930 the likes of Irving Fischer, Ragnar Frisch, Joseph Schumpeter, François Divisia, René Roy, 
Harold Hotelling or John Maynard Keynes founded the society, they aimed at unifying theoretical and empirical 
approaches and at “creating a society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and 
mathematics”. 
Second, although Emmanuel Farhi loved mathematics and was as proficient at it as any in the profession, he was 
not blinded by the tool. The elegance of his models was at the service of making ideas accessible, not of 
demonstrating technical prowess. 
The third permanent trait was doubt, the DNA behind his research. He was distrustful of fads, certainties, and 
preachers. He wanted to avoid the mistakes of the true believers. He was agnostic and let his science take him 
wherever it would lead, perhaps in unexpected directions. As a macroeconomist, his work can probably be best 
described as Keynesian, although he did not really care about labels. Again, he was wary of falling into the trap 
of thought-hindering prior beliefs, and wanted to unveil the conditions of Keynesian economics’ validity and its 
limits. His path breaking work made explicit the microeconomic imperfections at the root of macroeconomic 
failure, so as to build a normative analysis and thus formulate economic policy recommendations.  
Fourth, Emmanuel Farhi was enthusiastic about engaging with historical debates on important and enduring 
questions. Discussions with him were filled with fascinating remarks about Quesnay's tableau économique, 
Keynes’ paradox of thrift, the 1960s’ Cambridge-Cambridge controversy, Mundell’s trilemma, or Triffin’s 
dilemma. These historical insights, many of which had not found a proper formalization or whose implications 
were underexplored, resurfaced in his research work. 
The fifth trait capturing Emmanuel Farhi’s research is patience. In an interview given in April 2020, and taking 
his recent work on value chains with David Baqaee as an illustration, he emphasized that good research requires 
a sustained effort (he invited the French journalist to a rendezvous in a few years); and that communicating this 
research calls for being transparent on empirical uncertainty and candid about the limits of our  theoretical 
understanding. 
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Emmanuel Farhi felt that he had chosen a wonderful occupation; he loved his work, his colleagues, and his 
students. Yet, he thought we could do better collectively: take better care of students and junior faculty; be less 
competitive; listen more to others; show more respect and interest for those who work in dif ferent fields and 
with different approaches; restrain from using the media and blogs to arouse interest in one’s work prior to peer 
validation. It is true that our desire for recognition, which is human and a key motivator for accomplishment, 
sometimes grows into narcissism and distracts us from what we are meant to serve, science. We are all aware 
of our individual and collective shortcomings, but Emmanuel Farhi was more mindful than most of us about the 
need to strike the right balance between self interest and other-regarding behavior. With his meritocratic 
upbringing, he valued hard work and expressed outrage at the little arrangements and self -promotion that 
plague any profession, including ours. 
Those reflexions about our scientific duties, which he shared amicably with his friends over dinner, were not 
meant to take the high moral ground; that was definitely not his style. Most importantly, he implemented his 
standards as a colleague and a transmitter of knowledge. He could talk enthusiastically about his own work 
without ever overselling it, and only after listening to the research of colleagues, especially students and junior 
faculty. Nicolas Werquin, a young TSE researcher, accurately summed him up: “Emmanuel was a real role model 
for me. I of course admired his extraordinary intelligence and his depth of mind whenever we talked about 
research, but also the attention he paid to young researchers, his humility, generosity and kindness.” Emmanuel 
could have been more than full of himself; instead he always remained modestly attentive to others. 
Emmanuel Farhi never stayed in his ivory tower. Member of the French Government’s Conseil d’Analyse 
Économique from 2010, he was involved in French intellectual life. A few hours before his death, he took part in 
a meeting of the French president’s “commission of experts on the major economic challenges» which Olivier 
Blanchard and I have the honor of chairing. His intellectual qualities and his always well-argued dialogue made 
him a much sought- after advisor to public decision-makers, central banks, and other institutions in France and 
beyond. He actively advised the Banque de France, which awarded him a prize in 2013. 
Emmanuel remained very close to France, where he returned as often as he could. He appreciated his home 
country’s culture and art of living. A lover of French poetry and literature, he was sociable and fu ll of humor. A 
pure product of the French meritocratic republican school, he was also committed to the scientific life of his 
country. He came to Toulouse and to Paris several times a year, sharing his passion for economics with young 
researchers and students. He sat for a long time on TSE’s scientific council and was a member of its board of 
directors. He organized numerous conferences in France and in Europe. 
II. Contributions 
Emmanuel Farhi transformed the theory of taxation, macroeconomics, and international finance. His range of 
interests also included behavioral economics and even industrial organization. I cannot do justice to the breadth 
of his contributions (for one thing he was incredibly prolific) and this selection unavoidably will miss important 
material. But I can highlight a few elements. Being more knowledgeable about it, I will also put definitely much 
more emphasis on our joint work than is warranted (section III).  
Global imbalances 
An important paper with Ricardo Caballero and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, originating in a chapter of Emmanuel 
Farhi’s 2006 PhD thesis and subsequently published in 2008 as “An Equilibrium Model of Global Imbalances and 
Low Interest Rates” in the AER, conceptualized the consequences of global financial imbalances generated by a 
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shortage of stores of value. Emmanuel Farhi and his coauthors developed a simple framework with two countries 
which differ along two dimensions: their rate of economic growth, and the level of financial development, 
measured by the degree to which capital income can be pledged (itself determined by the legal framework, 
taxation, corporate governance or overall trust in management). Countries with low levels of financial 
development and high growth rates - the “South”- have a high demand for stores of value, but a low supply. 
Under autarky, asset prices in the South would be high - equivalently, the interest rate would be low. Countries 
with high levels of financial development and low growth rates - the “North”- would have a low demand for 
stores of value, but a high supply. Under autarky, asset prices in the North would be low- equivalently, the 
interest rate would be high. Under financial integration, comparative advantage implies that capital flows from 
the low financial development/high growth countries to the high financial development/low growth ones to 
equate global returns. This mechanism results in global imbalances: current account deficits in the North and 
surpluses in the South. The model provided an insightful and timely analysis of the joint pattern of current-
account balances, interest rates and external debt between the US and the rest of the world. 
More recently, the three authors revisited the global imbalance question in their paper “Global Imbalances and 
Policy Wars at the Zero Lower Bound” (forthcoming in REStud). As the desired demand for stores of value 
increases, the global real interest rate reaches a zero lower bound (ZLB, or more generally the effective lower 
bound, or ELB, since the rate at which monetary policy loses effectiveness need not be 0) due to constraints on 
nominal interest rates and price rigidities. The authors describe how the ZLB constitutes a tipping point for the 
global economy. Above the ZLB, capital flows are benign. They reallocate the excess demand for stores of value 
but do not affect economic activity. At the ZLB, the excess demand for stores of value creates a global recession, 
a version of Keynes’s paradox of thrift. Moreover, by running a current account surplus, a country can export its 
recession onto its trading partners. The model offers sharp and provocative insights: once at the ZLB, countries 
have a strong incentive to either depreciate their currency relative to their partners (currency wars) or to enact 
unilateral tariffs (trade wars). Both policies do little to address the underlying problem -the scarcity of stores of 
value- but redirect a deficient global demand towards domestic producers. Unlike these zero-sum policies, fiscal 
policy and public debt issuance in any country is globally helpful as it helps offset the underlying global shortage 
of assets. 
These papers focus mostly on a general shortage of stores of value, regardless of their risk characteristics. 
Emmanuel Farhi and his coauthors argued that the scarcity was particularly acute for safe assets whose defining 
characteristics is their resilience to adverse systemic events.  
In “The Safety Trap” (REStud 2017), Emmanuel Farhi and Ricardo Caballero, in a framework including in particular 
very risk-averse agents, argue that a shortage of safe assets has very different implications once the economy 
hits the zero lower bound (ZLB). The shortage first leads to a benign reduction in the riskless interest rate until 
the latter can no longer fall, at which point the equilibrating mechanism becomes a reduction in output and a 
recession. Like in the work on global imbalances discussed above, the sudden stop of the interest rate 
adjustment triggers a quantity adjustment and has an adverse impact on economic activity.  
Safe assets constitute the cornerstone of the global financial system. Few advanced countries -such as the U.S. 
- or private actors -such as some of the highest rated financial institutions- are able to issue safe assets. In the 
last decades, the supply of these safe assets (mostly from the U.S.) has not kept up with the high demand 
originating from emerging economies (in particular China) and their central banks. This resulted in a dramatic 
increase in the last 20 years in the price of these safe assets (a decline in their yields) relative to more risky assets 
(an increase in risk premia) and generated strong incentives for the private sector to manufacture “private 
labels” safe assets. This safe asset imbalance was a harbinger of the 2008 crisis, as the increase in securitization 
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–creating supposedly safe assets through tranching- contributed to the real estate boom in the United States. 
Emmanuel Farhi and his co-authors argued that the crisis and its aftermath exacerbated these trends: fiscal 
fragility in the Eurozone reduced the global supply of public safe assets, while most private label safe assets were 
recategorized as risky. Moreover, prudential regulation reforms further increased the demand for safe assets 
from financial institutions subject to new liquidity requirements. 
This global imbalance in safe assets makes the global financial and monetary system particularly vulnerable. A 
widely influential report, written for the French Council of Economic Advisers with Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and 
Hélène Rey in 2011, revisits Robert Triffin’s 1960 classic dilemma. Triffin noted a tension between the rapidly 
growing global demand for dollar holdings and the constant US stock of gold (recall that the gold standard was 
in effect until 1971, with the dollar pegged in terms of gold at the official exchange rate of $35 per ounce). The 
U.S. monetary authorities could either tighten dollar supplies -so as to keep the dollar-gold parity stable as 
envisioned by the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement- at the risk of a domestic and global recession or would soon 
be forced to let go of the gold peg. Emmanuel Farhi and his co-authors observed that the United States may be 
facing a modern version of the dilemma, with a growing demand for U.S. issued safe assets (mostly US 
Treasuries) but a limited fiscal capacity and their report discussed ways to increase the global supply of safe 
assets by pooling resources, using swap lines more systematically or encouraging the emergence of alternative 
safe assets from large and fiscally sound economies. 
Emmanuel Farhi insatiable curiosity led him to explore the foundations of international finance more 
systematically. His work with Matteo Maggiori, “A Model of the International Monetary System” (QJE 2018), 
focused on a world in which risk-free assets, as we have seen one of Emmanuel Farhi’s favorite themes, are 
provided by one or more reserve countries. Imagine that a country – say, the United States, whose debt has long 
served as a reserve asset – caters to an investment demand from investors across the rest of the world. Being 
the sole provider of that reserve asset, the United States can charge a mark-up and run a trade deficit. However, 
if the debt held by the rest of the world is too large, there is a risk of sovereign default2. This, in turn, undermines 
confidence in its currency: a “Triffin” moment. But if the dominant currency does not provide that liquidity, it 
may be overtaken by another country that will compete away the reserve currency rent. Emmanuel Farhi and 
Matteo Maggiori analyzed the possibility that a multipolar world- one with multiple reserve currencies- be more 
unstable than a world with a single reserve currency, reconciling the Keynesian stance with that of financial 
stability.  
Some of the ingredients of the Farhi-Maggiori framework, are taken off the shelf, in particular the Calvo 
(1988)/Cole-Kehoe (2000) model of self-fulfilling sovereign crises. A reserve country issues a “safe” bond, for 
which there is a demand by risk-averse investors in the rest of the world. Like in Calvo, the country may later on 
default at a cost, possibly destroying the reserve value of the bond. As discussed earlier, a higher level of 
borrowing triggers a higher risk of (endogenous) default: this is Triffin’s dilemma. A monopoly issuer may 
produce too much of the reserve asset: it tends to produce too little because of the standard monopoly 
distortion, but also may produce too much of the reserve asset in the absence of commitment (default implies 
a welfare loss for the inframarginal investors3). They also present an interesting extension to the case of a ZLB.  
Finally, let us point at Emmanuel Farhi’s work on rare disasters and exchange rates with Xavier Gabaix (QJE 
2016), which is one of the most interesting applications of the Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) idea that the 
 
2 Actually, default does not take the form of a formal repudiation or restructuring in the paper, but rather the debt is 
inflated away; but the outcome is the same. 
3 Industrial-organization oriented readers will here draw an interesting analogy with Spence’s 1975 choice of quality by a 
monopolist. 
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possibility of rare but extreme disasters is an important determinant of risk premia in asset markets. Farhi and 
Gabaix build a clean model delivering many insights into exchange rate dynamics.  
Public finance and inequality 
Together with Ivan Werning, Emmanuel Farhi investigated a number of dynamic public finance issues, such as 
the inheritance tax and the wealth tax4, that later became topical in the political arena. 
Emmanuel Farhi and Ivan Werning laid down the foundations for a progressive taxation of wealth and capital in 
order to build a reasoned debate on a very sensitive subject (“Progressive Estate Taxation”, QJE 2010). The first 
sentence of the article says it all: «One of the biggest risks in life is the family you are born into». The paper 
improved our understanding of the dual role of taxation as a redistributive tool (from the richer to the poorer) 
and as social insurance (from the active to the unemployed, for example) made necessary by the heterogeneity 
of individual trajectories. Consider the following simple economy: Parents live during the first period. In the 
second period they are replaced by their children. Parents are altruistic towards their child, they work, consume, 
and bequeath. To analyze welfare in such an economy, one must consider not a single fictitious “dynastic agent”, 
but rather a convex combination of the utilities of parents and children. Farhi and Werning take a veil of 
ignorance approach, combine Mirrleesian income tax with a bequest tax and derive the Pareto frontier. The 
intuition is that the planner should promote some equal opportunity; as Farhi and Werning say, “luck is  only 
imperfectly inherited” at the optimum. They show that the estate tax should be progressive. In that world, 
bequests should be subsidized (a subsidy encourages the provision of an externality, bequests, which improves 
the welfare of newborns), but if this infeasible, the estate tax should be equal to zero up to a threshold and 
progressive thereafter. Regardless, progressivity will promote equal opportunity. This analysis (as well as a 
couple of extensions) is extremely illuminating. 
Their 2012 JPE paper “Capital Taxation: Quantitative Explorations of the Inverse Euler Equation” evaluated the 
benefit of a tax on capital. In the standard Mirrlees (1971) model of labor taxation, it is suboptimal to tax capital 
(this is Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976’s idea that capital taxation distorts the savings decision and encourages current 
consumption over investment). By contrast, in a dynamic economy with unforeseen future individual 
productivity (disability, illness, stranded skills), a positive capital tax is optimal (as was shown in a two-period 
framework by Rogerson 1985, Diamond-Mirrlees 1977). As shown elegantly in the paper, this results from the 
no-capital-tax allocation satisfying the Euler equation, while the social optimum (subject to Mirrleesian non-
observability of individual productivity) satisfies the inverse Euler equation. The two coincide when there is no 
uncertainty (and so capital should not be taxed), but not under uncertainty. Jensen’s inequality delivers the 
positive capital tax rate. The key contribution of the paper is to develop the analysis in a multi-period context 
and to compute the welfare gain from introducing an optimal capital tax (relative to no tax at all). Their 
calibration found that general equilibrium effects (when the accumulation technology is concave) made the 
gains from capital taxation much smaller than what was suggested by partial equilibrium calculations (in which 
the pre-tax rate of interest is exogenous, i.e. the technology is linear). 
In the same year, they, together with Christopher Sleet and Sevin Yeltekin published in REStud “Non-linear 
 
4 Emmanuel Farhi’s job market paper, "Capital Taxation and Ownership when Markets Are Incomplete" (JPE, 2010), was 
the starting point of his work on capital taxation. That paper looked at a representative-agent economy with linear taxes 
on labor and capital. Financial markets are incomplete, and the government can avail itself of few instruments, so the 
complete-markets Ramsey outcome is not attainable. Emmanuel Farhi used calibration to show that optimal capital taxes 
are highly volatile in such circumstances.  
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Capital Taxation without Commitment”. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Again, 
the Atkinson-Stiglitz 1976 of optimality of absence of wealth taxation is violated (as it is in practice in most 
developed countries), but for a different reason. In the absence of commitment, past savings being inelastic are 
an obvious target for a benevolent, redistribution-minded government. To escape this ex-post non-distortive 
expropriation of existing wealth and its deleterious effect on capital accumulation, there must be a cost of 
expropriating agents’ wealth. With two periods this cost is assumed to be exogenous in the paper; with long 
horizons by contrast, it could just be the loss of reputation of the government, modeled as the outcome of a 
repeated game with constituents (or I should say overlapping generations of constituents). Like the progressive 
estate tax paper discussed above, the paper shows the optimality of progressive taxes on wealth that are positive 
at the top, unlike for the optimal income tax in Mirrlees’ classic paper (which has labor income taxes only). And 
it does so in a very robust form. The difference with the previous literature, the focus on wealth taxation and 
the state’s difficulty to commit, on top of labor taxation, is key. 
In their 2007 JPE paper (“Inequality and Social Discounting”), Farhi and Werning revisit the classic Atkeson and 
Lucas (1992) long-run immiseration result under repeated taste shocks. Like in the estate paper, it is desirable 
to insure the unborn against the risk associated with the draw of their ancestors. The welfare of future 
generations is embodied both through the altruism of earlier ones (as in Atkeson-Lucas) and directly. This 
importantly leads to a social discount factor higher than the private one. In turn, with ongoing taste shocks, this 
increased patience leads to more insurance for future generations and mean reversion (which goes with higher 
social mobility). And inequality remains bounded in the long run, unlike in Atkeson-Lucas. 
To conclude this discussion of Emmanuel Farhi’s contributions to public finance, we note that, in collaboration 
with Xavier Gabaix, he bridged behavioral and public economics. In the AER 2020 paper on “Optimal Taxation 
with Behavioral Agents”, they derive optimal Ramsey, Pigou and Mirrlees taxation with behavioral agents. Their 
key concept is the “behavioral wedge”, equal to the difference between the price and the marginal utility of the 
good, computed for the agent’s true or experienced utility. While the modeling is not fully general, it is much 
more so than standard modeling in the behavioral economics literature. Farhi and Gabaix show for instance that 
three classic models are special cases: decision vs. experienced utility (say, the hyperbolic discounting model, in 
which the current generation puts too much weight on present consumption), misperceptions (in which the 
consumer misperceives the price vector), and mental accounts (which they formalize as mental accounting 
functions that map prices and income into how much money is devoted to each subset of goods’ account). 
Behavioral economics had recently become a favorite topic of Emmanuel Farhi, who also revisited with Ivan 
Werning the New-Keynesian model when agents are imperfectly rational (they employ level-k thinking): see 
their 2019 AER paper on “Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality, and Incomplete Markets”.  
New Keynesian economics 
Emmanuel Farhi published a series of articles that transformed Keynesian macroeconomics. We already 
discussed a couple of these. More generally, Emmanuel Farhi and his coauthors allowed for a wide range of 
economic frictions:  slow price adjustments, the ZLB (the difficulty for the central bank to bring nominal interest 
rates below zero when cash guarantees a steady nominal value), the solvency constraints of banks and 
companies, the liquidity available in the economy, and economic agents’ behavioral anomalies. This work will 
continue to be relevant in the post-Covid economy. 
Along the slow-price-adjustment line, Emmanuel Farhi, together with Isabel Correia, Juan Pablo Nicolini, and 
Pedro Teles (AER 2013), built on the idea of using fiscal policy to lower real interest rates when the central bank 
can no longer adjust nominal rates downwards due to zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on nominal interest 
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rates: an increase in VAT recreating some inflation, accompanied by a decreasing trajectory of labor taxes to 
neutralize the impact of this consumer price adjustment on firms’ pricing response.  This overall idea of using 
fiscal policy to undo the deleterious effects of nominal rigidities had been developed by his coauthors (who 
showed that setting the nominal interest rate to 0 does not constrain policy if the state has enough instruments), 
and more informally by earlier writers such as Keynes (1931) and, for Japan, Feldstein (2000). In the four-author 
2013 paper, Emmanuel Farhi combined micro-foundations, dynamics, and expectations formation, enabling 
them to perform a full welfare analysis and so to establish public policy in firmer ground. Prices are sticky in the 
sense that they adjust when an opportunity arises (à la Calvo 1983). With lump-sum taxes, the allocation is even 
first best and therefore time-consistent (this is not so in the absence of lump-sum taxes); in any case the ZLB 
constraint is never binding. The authors did not build in a vacuum of course (important work had been done by 
Krugman and Eggertsson-Woodford for instance). Yet, its micro-foundations, which enable a full-fledged welfare 
and therefore policy analysis, make the paper particularly appealing. 
In a similar spirit, “Fiscal Devaluations” (REStud 2014), written jointly with Gita Gopinath and Oleg Itskhoki, 
shows that nominal exchange rate devaluations can be mimicked- in terms of their real outcomes- while keeping 
the nominal exchange rate fixed, through a small set of fiscal instruments, this regardless of the form and 
location of the price stickiness (wage stickiness, sticky producer currency pricing, sticky local currency pricing). 
The paper provides the first formal analysis of fiscal devaluations in a dynamic stochastic New Keynesian 
environment. The fiscal devaluation can be achieved through either (1) import tariffs and export subsidies, or 
(2) an increase in the VAT and a reduction in production taxes (in general complemented with an increase in 
income taxes and a reduction in consumption taxes).  
In “Dilemma not Trilemma? Capital Controls and Exchange Rates with Volatile Capital Flows” (IMF Economic 
Review 2014), Emmanuel Farhi and Ivan Werning started another major aspect of their collaboration, associated 
with price rigidities. Mundell famously argued that the case for restricting capital flows is much stronger for a 
country that is a member of a currency union or in a peg: While a flexible-exchange-rate country enjoys an 
independent monetary policy and can use it to counter shocks, a country with a fixed exchange rate cannot avail 
itself of this instrument and must therefore interfere with capital flows. Farhi and Werning’s first foray into the 
New Keynesian tradition argues that, with nominal rigidities, the capital account must be managed even if the 
exchange rate is flexible. They show that optimal controls lean against the wind, for example by matching a 
capital inflow with a temporary tax on inflows and a subsidy on outflows. 
Then came a particularly important contribution of the Farhi-Werning team: their paper on “Fiscal Unions” (AER 
2017). This paper revisits the old argument of Peter Kenen that there must be interregional transfers within a 
country of regions or a union of countries, so as to accommodate regional or country idiosyncratic shocks. The 
argument is more complex than it first appears, though, since economic agents can themselves buy insurance, 
at least if financial markets are well developed and so economic agents can design their privately optimal 
smoothing strategy (and to some extent they do: the pension of a resident of Texas is not much invested in 
Texan undertakings; but in practice the tax and welfare system adds further redistribution across American 
states). If financial markets are incomplete- in the sense that cross-states or international portfolio 
diversification is not available to consumers-, the federal government must of course substitute for the missing 
markets and provide the insurance itself (actually beyond the level consumers would choose if portfolio 
diversification were available, as we next see); but the paper finds a role for transfers even with complete 
financial markets. The paper introduces aggregate demand externalities by putting a New Keynesian model in 
an optimal insurance framework. In such an environment, fiscal transfers should go beyond what economic 
agents will arrange for themselves. Interestingly, there is a formal analogy between the two frameworks 
(incomplete financial markets and sticky prices) vindicating cross-region or cross-country transfers. The paper 
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studies the constrained efficient allocations, under the twin-constraints of price rigidity (the price of the non-
traded goods is not state contingent) and currency union (the price of traded goods is the same across countries). 
The two constraints taken together prevent a proper adjustment of the relative prices to the realization of the 
state of nature.  
A transfer to a country increases consumption of traded and non-traded goods. Due to price rigidity, the impact 
on non-traded goods is particularly powerful in a bad state of the world for the country (the country is in a bust), 
and thus stabilizes output and income across countries. In a sense, this paper provides a coherent framework 
for the conventional wisdom that currency unions must be completed by fiscal ones, a point that has been made 
repeatedly in the Eurozone context. Optimal transfers should address only asymmetric shocks and should be 
increasing in the persistence of these shocks, as one would expect. In contrast with earlier wisdom, transfers are 
more effective in a more closed economy (countries outside the currency union achieve their stabilization 
through the flexibility of their exchange rate).  
By limiting necessary price adjustments, monetary unions pose a host of other problems under decentralized 
fiscal policy. Mark Aguiar, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi and Gita Gopinath in “Coordination and Crisis in 
Monetary Unions” (QJE 2015) study issues related to member countries’ lack of commitment with respect to 
the repayment of their sovereign debt, while the common central bank selects inflation (also without 
commitment). Countries, if left on their own, tend to over-borrow, constrained only by the threat of a 
permanent lack of access to capital markets and an output cost if they ever choose to default (by contrast, there 
is no punishment when the central bank inflates away sovereign debt). The central bank can erase some of the 
countries’ debts by creating inflation; as usual, the expectation of inflation is embodied in the interest rate. 
Inflation is distortionary, but time inconsistency means that the central bank, which internalizes the total welfare 
in the monetary union (in contrast with fiscal authorities, which only internalize domestic welfare), cannot help 
but creating inflation. How much inflation it creates depends on the total stock of debt to alleviate (I will reason 
with a representative member state for simplicity, even though an important component of the analysis focuses 
on high and low debt countries and their incentive to join the monetary union). To the standard inefficiency due 
to the lack of commitment, is added another, fiscal inefficiency. Each country ignores (if small, more generally 
insufficiently accounts for) the impact of its borrowing on total debt and therefore on inflation. Therefore, the 
monetary union (in the absence of fiscal union) generates higher debt, higher inflation, and lower welfare. This 
externality differs from other, not-inflation-based borrowing externalities, such as the bailout externalities of 
my AER 2015 country solidarity paper, or the more traditional expropriation externalities of default on sovereign 
bondholders. This is a very interesting paper, and very rich beyond the features I just highlighted: asymmetric 
indebtedness, fundamental debt crises vs. Cole-Kehoe (2000) style self-fulfilling crises… 
Finally, the “Fiscal Union” paper led Emmanuel Farhi and Ivan Werning to realize that a more general economic 
force of an aggregate demand externality is at play. They looked at macroprudential interventions when price 
or wage rigidities combined with a ZLB or fixed exchange rates constrain monetary policy (“A Theory of 
Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities”, Econometrica, 2016). The paper, which 
represents the culmination of this line of work, shows that aggregate demand externalities matter for the design 
of policy (or financial taxes) much more generally. It offers a general theory of externalities which nests 
aggregate demand externalities (nominal rigidities, constraints on monetary policy, that had been the early 
Farhi-Werning focus) and pecuniary ones (associated with imperfect financial markets, i.e. incomplete markets 
or asymmetric information in contracting, that Ricardo Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy, Guido Lorenzoni 
and others had focused on). The two forms of externalities differ, as pecuniary externalities operate through 
price movements whereas price rigidities by essence prevent such movements. Yet, the main result is a simple 
and robust formula for how much one should distort financial transactions. Intuitively, it shows how the inherent 
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distortions in spot markets can be optimally improved by engineering distortions (taxes or restrictions) in 
financial markets. The results are expressed in terms of “wedges” from the first best, capturing under-or over-
provision of goods. 
Input-output linkages 
With his former student, David Baqaee, Emmanuel had been working in the last few years on exciting new 
methods for growth accounting. This line of research, starting with their 2019 Econometrica paper, “The 
Macroeconomic Impact of Microeconomic Shocks: Beyond Hulten's Theorem”, aims at analyzing 
macroeconomics as a network of interacting industries and at seeing how economic shocks have cascading 
effects, with implications such as the tripling of the oil shock impact in the 1970s, or the current devastating 
economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic. In this field of research launched by Hulten, and then pursued 
by Gabaix, Acemoglu and their co-authors, Baqaee and Farhi showed how linear approximations can be 
misleading and they extended Hulten’s theorem.  
Hulten, himself building on Solow’s earlier work, showed that aggregate productivity growth, defined as output 
growth minus share-weighted input growth, is equal to a weighted sum of microeconomic changes in 
technology. This characterization relies on perfect competition, and more generally the absence of frictions 
(such as financial frictions etc). In what is likely to become extremely influential work, Baqaee and Farhi extend 
Hulten’s aggregation result in economies with arbitrary input-output network linkages, in the more relevant case 
of inefficient economies. The frictions considerably change the order of magnitude of estimated macroeconomic 
impacts of shocks or policy. A TFP shock in some industry reallocates outputs elsewhere and associated changes 
in allocative efficiency are no longer equal to zero as in Hulten. This non-linear characterization of production 
shocks delivers for example, as mentioned above, a three-fold increase in the impact of the oil shock in the 70s.  
Baqaee and Farhi applied their approach to a variety of questions. For instance, in their 2020 QJE paper 
“Productivity and Misallocation in General Equilibrium”, they estimate that the improvement in allocative 
efficiency, due to the reallocation over time of market share to high-markup firms, accounts for about half of 
aggregate TFP growth over the period 1997-2015. This is due to a composition effect between firms, in which 
firms with high markups, which were too small in the first place, gained market share. Similarly, they estimate 
that reductions in markups have effects of several orders of magnitude higher than those envisioned by 
Harberger in 1954. Similarly, in “Networks, Barriers, and Trade”, they show that gains from trade are larger than 
initially thought, whenever production networks exhibit complementarities in production. They re-emphasize 
this theme in a recent discussion paper, called “The Darwinian Returns to Scale”: An increase in the size of a 
market generates more competition; big firms expand, small firms shrink and exit, and new firms enter. And 
especially, resources are reallocated from low-markup to high-markup firms. 
Beyond the input-output and growth accounting themes emphasized in David and Emmanuel’s early papers, 
their overarching goal is to unpack the aggregate representation of production in macroeconomics starting at a 
fully disaggregated, microeconomic level. As they say, they are after unbundling reduced forms that are familiar 
in macroeconomic models: the aggregate production function and the representative agent. This under various 
distortions, consumer heterogeneity, and general demand and supply functions. For example, inspired by 
Quesnay’s tableau économique, they study a broad class of models with heterogeneous agents and input-output 
networks and investigate the propagation of shocks, looking not only at aggregate implications but also at the 
impact on an industry of a shock arising in another industry (“Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Agents and 
Input-Output Networks”); in contrast with a partial equilibrium approach, the paper considers not only the 
impact of the shock on the industry in which it originates, but also on the many other industries that this shock 
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will impact. 
Relatedly, in his Journal of the European Economic Association lecture (delivered at the 2018 EEA Congress), 
Emmanuel Farhi once again revisited an important debate in the history of economic thought: the Cambridge 
(UK)-Cambridge (US) controversy. The Cambridge-UK side argued that one cannot in general subsume the capital 
stock into a single, aggregated index number, as is done for instance to derive the decreasing-returns property, 
to determine the distribution of income (based on the implication that the distribution of income is determined 
by relative factor scarcity), or to compute the rate of interest (technologically driven and equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital). It used “re-switching” examples in which diminishing returns obtain for every capital 
good, but not overall: the relationship between the capital-labor ratio is non-monotonic as a function of the rate 
of interest. But failing a convincing alternative to the Solow-type reduced-form production function, the 
macroeconomics of growth with its classic models (exogenous growth with Hicks-neutral, labour-augmenting or 
capital-augmenting variants, endogenous growth) kept using neoclassical production functions, which remains 
the ultra-dominant paradigm. Emmanuel and David’s work do not impose a parametric structure on the 
aggregate production function, but rather derive it from microeconomic foundations allowing for arbitrary 
input-output and substitutability patterns, but assuming that final demand is homothetic and there are no 
distortions- they look at a competitive equilibrium with constant or decreasing returns to scale for the various 
goods in an economy in which each good is produced from the primary factors as well as from other goods (they 
show that these assumptions yield the existence of a production function). They give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the possibility of capital aggregation. 
Baqaee and Farhi’s research was booming; I counted no less than seven discussion papers all dated in the last 
two years of Emmanuel’s life, besides the published ones. There is no question that Emmanuel’s contributions 
will have a deep influence in this field too. 
III. Co-authorship 
I met Emmanuel Farhi when he was a 1st year PhD student, and had the privilege of working with him since 
then. I was immediately struck by how brilliant he was, even by the standards of top MIT students. I started 
working with Emmanuel in industrial organization. Indeed, we published a couple of papers in collaboration with 
Josh Lerner. For example, our 2013 Rand paper formalized the privately optimal arrangement between agents 
who are eager to get their work certified (bond issuer, academic author, etc) and certifiers (rating agencies, 
scientific journals, etc). This arrangement involves a simple and familiar form of collusion between certifier and 
certified at the expense of the community: acceptances, but not applications, are disclosed. The equilibrium also 
exhibits certified agents moving down their pecking order, starting with more demanding and therefore 
prestigious certifiers and lowering their ambitions when rejected. But, although Emmanuel excelled at IO, I 
quickly realized that his heart was on the macro side.  
I of course feel awkward about speaking about my joint work with him. But I will do so without too much 
embarrassment, such was his contribution in each of the jointly authored papers. It is also a source of pleasure 
because it reminds me of very fond memories. I am truly grateful for the wonderful moments of discovery and 
excitement experienced when working with him. I will try to describe a few papers and explain why we wrote 
them. I hope that, in doing so and even though I will not be able to give due credit to the other researchers who 
have worked along similar lines, I will not over-promote the papers. Emmanuel Farhi was humble and would not 
have liked that.  
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The selected papers share the same three running themes: 
1. Public finances are exposed to an illiquid financial system. That observation holds even in the absence 
of connivance of officials with bankers; for, the state relies on the financial system for the continuity of 
“core services”, such as loans to SMEs (hence a concern for a credit crunch) and the repayment of 
liabilities held by other economically and politically sensitive depositors, such as insured deposits (the 
state enables such deposits through its being the only insurer of last resort5) and deposits held by other 
regulated financial institutions (through the federal funds market, CDSs and other cross-bank 
contracting). 
2. Capital markets are imperfect. The imperfection of capital markets is a necessary condition for illiquidity, 
as we learnt long ago from Arrow. Factors such as agency costs prevent the pledging of the entirety of 
the benefits from investment to outside investors, resulting in credit rationing. In turn, the anticipation 
of credit rationing gives rise to a familiar demand for liquidity (hoarding of stores of value on the asset 
side, lengthening of the debt maturity on the liability side). Putting this idea in a general equilibrium 
context was the starting point of my 1998 work with Bengt Holmström on the determinants of aggregate 
liquidity shortages. As we saw, imperfect capital markets had already played a key role in Emmanuel 
Farhi’s pioneering work with Ricardo Caballero and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas on global financial 
imbalances.  
3. The exposure of public finances to the financial system is endogenous  (is subject to moral hazard). 
Depending on the application we developed, the financial institution may have become illiquid because 
of a combination of a high short-term debt and a low level of safe stores of value (“level 1+2 liquid 
assets” in the jargon of prudential regulation), of investments in risky assets (stochastic bubbles, risky 
domestic Sovereign’s bond holdings, etc), or else of liquidity coverage that is not a real one (as when 
AIG insured many financial institutions through the CDS channel and defaulted, leaving these 
institutions exposed to the underlying risks).  
The three ingredients generate macroeconomic effects of prudential regulation, whether done right or poorly, 
and ultimately macroprudential-financial-regulation recommendations. 
Monetary bailouts 
 
The AER 2012 paper on “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts” connected two 
observations about the 2008 crisis: a wide-scale maturity mismatch in the banking sector and a “monetary 
bailout” provided by all central banks. To boost their return on equity, many commercial and investment banks 
gambled on the debt maturity structure. They picked a high short-term debt, and a low volume of safe assets. 
Such a maturity mismatch is more profitable in the short-term because demandable liabilities is what investors 
prefer, and also because safe assets are in short supply and command low yields. But it exposes the banks to 
illiquidity if they incur losses. 
A monetary bailout is defined as a rescue of illiquid banks through the facilitating their refinancing (low interest 
rate, acceptance of low-quality collateral). This is in contrast with direct transfers, such as a recapitalization, that 
boost the distressed banks’ net worth. The “bailout” terminology came from the idea that the policy imposes a 
levy on savers, who receive a low rate of return on their investments. The paper built on a feedback loop 
between a monetary bailout and the maturity mismatch; for, risk taking exhibits strategic complementarities: If 
 
5 The state is by and large the only player in the economy that is able to tap into the taxpayers’ income in adverse 
macroeconomic states of nature; the foundations for this lie in the inability of future and even current taxpayers to pledge 
a substantial fraction of their future income, an inability that admits multiple rationales. 
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I am alone in going primarily for short-term debt and rollover refinancing in financial markets, the central bank 
won't lower the interest rates only for me. But if we all do that, then the central bank won't have a choice. In 
the context of gambling on illiquidity under the prospect of a monetary bailout, we called these strategic 
complementarities “collective moral hazard”. 
Such strategic complementarities are common in many fields. They arise for instance when public policies are 
not targeted (as is the case here); for example, owners’ political ability to protect an asset’s value- say a house 
near an airport or a savings instrument benefitting from a tax loophole- is stronger if many have invested in the 
asset. There's strength in numbers! 
Non-targeted policies are costly: a monetary bailout applies to all actors, even the financially unconstrained ones 
that the state does not want to help; it makes asset owners richer; it distorts the allocation of savings and 
investment. So, if one wants to support distressed banks and avoid a credit crunch, why not instead directly 
recapitalize the banks? Interestingly, monetary bailouts are still desirable even when fiscal bailouts are feasible. 
The idea hinges on asymmetric information about the banks’ actual refinancing needs. A low-interest-rate policy 
is a screening device: It benefits primarily those institutions with actual borrowing needs.  
Bubbly Liquidity 
The eponymous 2012 REStud paper started from the old distinction, revisited in my work with Bengt Holmström 
(1998), between inside liquidity (the value of securities issued by financially constrained entities) and outside 
liquidity (the assets that originate in a different sector in the economy, most notably government debt). Enter 
bubbles, a form of outside liquidity. Bubbles have a leverage effect and a liquidity effect, due to the fact that 
depending on circumstances and their lifecycle, corporations and banks are both savers and borrowers. The 
leverage effect is the standard one: A bubble increases the supply of investment vehicles and lead to an increase 
in the interest rate, crowding out productive investment. The liquidity effect comes from the reduction in the 
price of liquidity, which crowds in investment, although only for financially constrained institutions. In that 
paper, “risk taking” is synonymous of leveraged institutions’ holding of bubbles; one may have in mind for 
example the exposure of American or Spanish banks to their domestic real estate bubble prior to the 2008 crisis.  
The introduction of imperfect capital markets alters standard results of the economics of bubbles. Because 
financial markets are imperfect, the social rate of return on internal funds exceeds that on borrowed funds; this 
implies that the economy can be dynamically efficient and at the same time the rate of interest can be lower 
than the rate of growth (r<g) and bubbles can exist. The classic Abel-Mankiw-Summers-Zeckhauser (1989)’s test, 
comparing what the productive sector disgorges and how much it invests, remains valid as a test of dynamic 
efficiency, but not as a test for the possibility of bubbles: dynamic inefficiency is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for the possibility of bubbles. Finally, the crash of a bubble generates low-interest rates and an increase 
in leverage, and so bubbles carry a risk premium even in a risk-neutral environment. Like the collective-moral-
hazard paper, the bubbly liquidity piece called for macroprudential regulation. 
Doom loops 
In the REStud 2018 paper ““Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops”, we analyzed 
the vicious circles created by the mutual financial interdependence between banks and their sovereigns, which 
is still a major current concern in Europe. Around 2009-2010, bank and sovereign CDS spreads started to move 
in lockstep, which suggested the possibility of a doom loop in which sovereign fragility would jeopardize banks 
holding domestic sovereign bonds (as in Greece) and/or that bank distress would imperil public finances and 
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sovereign debt sustainability (as in Ireland), and vice-versa. To account for this, we developed a “double-decker 
bailout” framework, with domestic bailout of the banking system by the Sovereign on the one hand and 
sovereign debt forgiveness by international creditors or country bailout by other countries on the other. 
As we have seen, an adverse shock to the economy then has two effects on the solvency of Sovereign: a direct 
negative effect on the fiscal revenues of the Sovereign, with a resulting increase in the Sovereign’s spread; and, 
if banks own the Sovereign bond, an increase in the occurrence of banking bailouts. This latter increase is 
financed by issuing additional debt, further increasing the spread. For every dollar of bailout that the Sovereign 
provides to the banks, public debt must increase by more than a dollar. 
The key result is that a re-nationalization of financial markets occurs upon the accrual of bad news about the 
banks’ balance sheet or the Sovereign’s ability to reimburse its debts. There are two channels, associated with 
the two bailout puts: First, banks’ bailout put is more valuable in bad times and so domestic banks will devote 
more resources to concealing from the supervisor their direct and indirect exposures to the Sovereign. Second, 
bad times make it more likely that the Sovereign obtains assistance or debt forgiveness, and so the latter may 
be tempted to relax its grip on the banks it supervises. This provides two rationales for externalized banking 
supervision: For a fragile debtor country, externalization acts as a commitment for the country not to loosen its 
banking supervision. And the externality created by a lax banking supervision by a country generates foreign 
countries’ demand for centralized supervision, as they may later on have to take the country out of default. 
Shadow banking 
The 2021 REStud paper “Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation”  stresses 
the need for sound policies to deal with the growth of shadow banking. Traditional banking is built on four pillars: 
The commercial bank is prudentially supervised; in exchange it gets access to lender of last resort and to deposit 
insurance; it caters to “special depositors”, the retail depositors who want a liquid and safe vehicle for their 
savings, and to “special borrowers”, the small and medium enterprises that need close oversight to secure 
financing. These two activities are, in the paper, the “core functions”, the successful delivery of which 
governments attach great social value to.  
Why do we observe such a peculiar arrangement? After all, access to the “public insurance services” (LOLR, 
deposit insurance) could be priced and offered to entire financial system. Our simple answer is that banking 
supervision lowers the cost of these put options on taxpayer money to the extent that it reduces risk taking. The 
paper’s second contribution is to provide a rationale for two structural remedies: ring-fencing and migration of 
transactions towards central clearing counterparties (CCPs). The rationale for both is to avoid the gaming of 
hedging among financial intermediaries, resulting in banks being only partially covered as they hoard bogus 
liquidity (the “AIG syndrome”) and in public liquidity being syphoned off to the shadow sector (the “conduit 
syndrome”). 
IV. A last word  
We have lost an unparalleled thinker and a great human being. When contemplating what Emmanuel Farhi had 
already achieved by the age of 41, one cannot help experiencing a sense of huge scholarly loss, shuddering at 
the thought of the missing ground-breaking work that will never happen. The best hommage we can pay to his 
contributions, his creativity, and his generosity vis-à-vis colleagues, staff and students, is to do our best to pursue 
his intellectual and human legacy. 
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